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 Military Culture and Jeffrey W. Legro
 Inadvertent Escalation
 in World War U
 H ow can the use of
 "unthinkable" means of warfare be avoided? How can states successfully
 observe mutually desired limitations on "taboo" forms of combat?1 These
 questions are important because of concern that nuclear, chemical, and bio-
 logical weapons and terrorism will spread and be used. The growing number
 of states-e.g., Israel, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Ukraine-that have such
 means of inflicting harm increases the likelihood that any future conflict will
 involve a desire for restrictions. Countries may pursue restraint because
 popular opinion vilifies certain weapons;2 because leaders calculate that es-
 calation would damage their domestic and international political support;3 or
 because states fear retaliatory attacks. Unfortunately, even when nations
 agree that limitations are desirable, restraint does not always endure. A key
 source of this disparity can be found in accidents and inadvertent escalation.
 In contemporary affairs among major powers, the apparent absence of
 grounds for intentional aggression, against a backdrop of change and insta-
 bility, makes the unintended expansion of conflict a central concern.4 States
 may not seek a spiral of hostility but still can stumble into escalation. Why?
 Jeffrey W. Legro is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota.
 I am grateful to Robert Jervis, Ido Oren, Arthur Stein, Richard Rosecrance, and two anonymous
 reviewers for their comments on the ideas presented here.
 1. The term "unthinkable" comes from Herman Kahn's study on nuclear warfare, Thinking About
 the Unthinkable (New York: Horizon Press 1962). Here the terms "unthinkable" or "taboo" indicate
 the stigma attached by public opinion and the international community to the use of certain
 instruments of warfare. It does not mean that states, and especially their military organizations,
 do not think about, and plan for, their use in war.
 2. Often there seems to be little logic to such a stigma. For example, in World War II it became
 acceptable to the allies to roast Japanese soldiers alive in caves with flame throwers, while the
 use of gas for the same task was considered by some to be illegitimate. There is a large literature
 on the "just" use of force from a moral or legal perspective. See e.g., Michael Walzer, Just and
 Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (New York: Basic Books, 1977); Geoffrey
 Best, Humanity in Warfare (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980); William V. O'Brien, The
 Conduct of a Just and Litnited War (New York: Praeger, 1981).
 3. In the 1990-91 Gulf War bomber and missile attacks against targets in Iraq, the U.S.-led
 coalition made concerted efforts to avoid civilian casualties which might show up on television
 and promote opposition to the war.
 4. Accidents and inadvertence have received considerable attention recently. See Scott D. Sagan,
 The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, anid Nuclear Weapons (Princeton: Princeton University
 International Security, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Spring 1994), pp. 108-142
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 An intriguing set of cases from the Second World War offers new insights
 and leverage on the problem of taboo warfare and inadvertence.5 In the
 interwar years, three means of warfare were especially singled out and
 denigrated as inhumane and illegitimate: submarine attacks against merchant
 ships, the aerial bombing of non-military targets, and the use of poison gas.
 At the outset of World War II, countries explicitly recognized and desired a
 distinct limit or "firebreak" between restraint and escalation in each of the
 three means of warfare, despite the fact that all were considered militarily
 significant. Shortly after fighting broke out, however, submarine warfare
 escalated beyond restrictions. Strategic bombing, restrained at first, was later
 employed extensively. In contrast chemical weapons, despite expectations
 and preparations, were never used. Accidents and inadvertence, while not
 always the main factor, were involved in each of these cases.6 How were
 these incidents allowed to occur? Why did some unintended events lead to
 escalation, while others were brushed aside allowing restraint to endure?
 I argue that the main existing theories of inadvertence-Clausewitz's no-
 tion of friction, the security dilemma, and organization theory7-provide poor
 predictions for the events of World War JJ.8 I develop and test an alternative
 approach, organizational culture, that provides a better explanation. Military
 cultures-beliefs and norms about the optimal means to fight wars-are
 important because they have a pervasive impact on the preferences and
 actions of both armies and states. While traditional organizational theory
 Press, 1993); Barry Posen, Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks (Ithaca: Cornell
 University Press, 1992); Bruce G. Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War (Washington, D.C.:
 Brookings, 1993).
 5. Much of the literature is limited by its focus on the bipolar U.S.-Soviet nuclear competition.
 The emerging multi-polar nuclear world, however, makes the historical experience of countries
 other than the two superpowers increasingly relevant, especially if, as I argue, restraint is
 influenced by national traits. The narrow concern with nuclear warfare precludes historical
 analysis of variations in use in this form of combat because of the welcome absence of instances
 of inadvertent nuclear escalation. One study that takes a historical comparative perspective on
 escalation is Richard Smoke, War: Controlling Escalation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
 1977).
 6. My broader study Cooperation Under Fire (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, forthcoming)
 examines the overall pattern of cooperation and conflict implicit in the restraint and escalation
 of World War II. This article focuses on the accidental and inadvertent elements of escalation
 rather than the intentional decisions of states to violate limitations.
 7. These three are highlighted by Posen, Inadvertent Escalation, pp. 12-23.
 8. A fourth image might be based on a realist "strategic rationality." However, the focus of this
 essay is inadvertence where states do not desire escalation. From the perspective of a unitary
 state, a strategic rationale for accidental escalation makes little sense. Nonetheless, strategic
 rationality is discussed at different points below in order to better delineate the organizational
 culture approach.
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 emphasizes the importance of formal structure in causing uniform military
 behavior, a cultural approach contends that differences in belief can lead to
 dissimilar actions.9 Military organizational cultures not only influence what
 types of accidents might occur, but more importantly, what the implications
 of those incidents will be for escalation. Where specific means of warfare are
 compatible with the dominant war-fighting culture of a country's key military
 services, that nation is likely to take actions that contribute to escalation. In
 such situations, the military will emphasize the antagonistic role the other
 side played, encourage propagandistic use of the incident, and highlight the
 advantages in escalation. Yet when a type of warfare is antithetical to one
 side's military culture, that state will support restraint even in the face of
 provocative enemy incidents. It will suppress information that might en-
 courage escalation, accept accidents as such regardless of evidence, make
 efforts to communicate good will to the opposing side, and reject any internal
 proposals to seize propaganda advantages. In short, organizational culture
 leads to dynamics in use and restraint that are not predicted by the random-
 ness of friction, the security dilemma, or traditional organization theory.
 This argument has implications for both theory and policy. Much of the
 work in the security studies literature has emphasized the international de-
 terminants of the use of force such as the military balance, the struggle for
 security, or the prevailing norms or laws of war.10 This emphasis, however,
 has tended to ignore important domestic determinants of escalation. The
 historical cases below indicate the powerful influence of organizational dy-
 9. Whereas a cultural approach predicts that militaries can either foster or inhibit escalation,
 work in the traditional school such as Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban
 Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971); Barry Posen, The Sources of Military
 Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
 1984); Posen, Inadvertent Escalation; and Richard Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises
 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), anticipates that all militaries will favor offense
 and tend to provoke escalation in war. Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation
 and the Modern Military (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991) challenges the monolithic view
 of organizations in his study of innovation, which emphasizes the politics of promotion, mea-
 sures of strategic effectiveness, and the management of innovation. I argue that culture is critical
 to each of these three factors.
 10. Sidney Verba, "Assumptions of Rationality and Non-rationality in Models of the Interna-
 tional System," World Politics, Vol. 14, No. 1 (October 1961), p. 115; Arnold Wolfers, Discord and
 Collaboration (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), pp. 13-16; Theodore Lowi, The
 End of Liberalism: Ideology, Policy, and the Crisis of Public Authority (New York: Norton, 1969),
 pp. 158-160; Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine, pp. 59-79, 228-236; Charles Lipson, "Interna-
 tional Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs," World Politics, Vol. 37, No. 1 (October
 1984), pp. 1-23; Benjamin Miller, "Explaining Great Power Cooperation in Conflict Manage-
 ment," World Politics, Vol. 45, No. 1 (October 1992), pp. 17-26.
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 namics within nation-states. My contention is not that militaries always tend
 to foster escalation, as traditional organization theory would suggest. Rather,
 the point is that the armed forces, depending on their culture, can either
 reinforce restraint or instigate escalation. In the past, countries have made
 considerable efforts both to reach diplomatic agreements (e.g., the Hotline,
 the Incidents at Sea accords) and to develop technical procedures (e.g.,
 permissive action links [PALS] on nuclear weapons) intended to control
 unwanted events. My thesis suggests that leaders concerned with avoiding
 undesired escalation in future conflicts must also pay attention to and man-
 age, not only the military organizations that implement the use of force, but
 also the beliefs and norms that characterize those organizations. This is no
 small task and it may demand a new system of civil-military relations, a topic
 taken up in the conclusion.
 I develop this argument by first exploring the logic of three traditional
 approaches to inadvertent escalation-friction, the security dilemma, tradi-
 tional organization theory-and the new one, organizational culture. These
 ideas, particularly the organizational culture perspective, are then assessed
 in comparative cases involving inadvertence in submarine, aerial, and chem-
 ical warfare between Britain and Germany in World War II. Finally, the
 concluding sections draw together the empirical evidence and outline the
 import of the findings for theory and policy on escalation and restraint.
 Images of Inadvertence
 It might seem contradictory to speak of explanations of accidents and inad-
 vertent escalation-phenomena that seem inherently unpredictable-but ex-
 planations do in fact exist. There are two elements demanding explanation.
 The first is to account for the origins of accidents-those unintended and
 unexpected events. The second issue, central here, is how to explain the
 consequences of accidents: why some lead to the widespread crossing of a
 recognized limit on war, while others are ignored and restraint endures. Four
 approaches offer answers: Clausewitz's notion of friction, the security di-
 lemma, traditional organization theory, and organizational culture.
 FRICTION
 The most widely accepted theory on accidents is Clausewitz's thesis pre-
 sented in On War. He posits that accidents are unpredictable. His term for
 this is "friction" or "the fog of war." This concept asserts that a variety of
 International Security 18:4 | 112
 factors can impose themselves unexpectedly between plans and actual out-
 comes. For example, communication and control of forces are difficult in
 war; amidst the chaos of combat, intelligence is often uncertain or misleading;
 soldiers get scared or tired and make mistakes. Clausewitz writes, "This
 tremendous friction which cannot, as in mechanics, be reduced to a few
 points, is everywhere in contact with chance, and brings about effects that
 cannot be measured, just because they are largely due to chance."11
 His theme is that accidents are random and unavoidable under the de-
 mands of battle. Clausewitz's ideas make intuitive and empirical sense. By
 their very definition, accidents have multiple and often unforeseeable causes.
 This thesis is somewhat blunt and only gives the most general notion of why
 and how they might come about. Nonetheless, the logic of Clausewitz's ideas
 suggests that unintended escalation is particularly likely when the employ-
 ment of force is complex, when the battle is intense, and when information
 (on what one should do, or what the enemy is doing) is uncertain.12
 The mishaps of the 1980 U.S. raid to free the hostages held in Iran exem-
 plify the complexity, intensity, and "fog" problems that can beset military
 operations. The rescue effort was a high-stakes, high-risk multi-service mis-
 sion in unfamiliar enemy territory. Although the weather forecast was for
 clear skies, the helicopters ran into giant dust clouds. At the "uninhabited"
 meeting spot in the middle of the Iranian desert, the rescue team encountered
 a bus-load of Iranian travellers. Three helicopters suffered problems that
 grounded them and resulted in the collapse of the overall operation. One
 helicopter was forced down by a crew member's simple mistake of leaving
 a flak jacket or duffel bag over an engine cooling unit.13 No one could have
 foreseen these particular difficulties, but as Clausewitz warns, given the
 complexity and pressures of the operation, some undesired incidents were
 unavoidable.
 11. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and transl. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton:
 Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 120; also see pp. 113-122.
 12. Modern day accident theorists echo Clausewitz's thesis by positing that unwanted incidents
 will be more likely in areas of warfare where there is technical and organizational complexity.
 Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living with High Risk Technology (New York: Basic Books, 1984),
 pp. 3-4, 330-335. Perrow's argument is that complex organizations that deal with high-risk
 technologies will inevitably incur accidents. An application of this thesis in the military realm
 is Chris C. Demchak, Military Organizations, Complex Machines: Modernization in the U.S. Armed
 Services (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991). For a test of this thesis vis-a-vis the nuclear
 weapons accidents of the United States, see Sagan, The Limits of Safety.
 13. Paul B. Ryan, The Iranian Rescue Mission: Why It Failed (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute
 Press, 1985), esp. chapters 4 and 5.
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 THE SECURITY DILEMMA
 What Robert Jervis and others have called the "security dilemma" links the
 structure and technology that characterize a conflict situation to the possi-
 bility of inadvertence.14 This dilemma is produced by the anarchic nature of
 international relations that causes distrust among states: one states's defen-
 sive efforts can make others less secure. The resulting insecurity leads to
 action and reaction, producing spirals of hostility and escalation, ending in
 an arms race or the actual use of force.
 It is easy to grasp how the insecurity and uncertainty characteristic of
 ongoing armed conflict would produce fear on each side that the other might
 abrogate a pledge of non-use in order to gain an advantage. The security
 dilemma is magnified and escalation made likely when defensive capabilities
 cannot be distinguished from offensive ones and offense has the advantage.
 This structural circumstance seems particularly likely to lead to first use in
 two ways. First, when a state's doctrines or weapons depend on surprise for
 effectiveness, that country has an incentive to undertake a first strike. Rec-
 ognizing this incentive, an opponent is likely to be especially nervous about
 its vulnerabilities and will keep a tight finger on its trigger.15 Leaders may
 face a "use-'em-or-lose-'em" dilemma, in which they perceive that their own
 security is endangered if they do not act first; this invites preemptive esca-
 lation. Thus, according to security dilemma logic, in war inadvertent esca-
 lation is likely when first-strike or use-'em-or-lose-'em incentives are present.
 One example of the dangers of this dilemma comes from the fable of King
 Arthur at the battle of Camlan; a negotiation between two suspicious armies
 erupted into unpremeditated slaughter when one soldier drew his sword to
 kill a snake and others, thinking that a battle had begun, followed suit to
 defend themselves.16 Similarly in 1890, during a U.S. Army search of a Sioux
 village, both soldiers and inhabitants had a tense grip on their rifles. When
 one rifle accidentally went off, a storm of unintended and unanticipated
 gunfire was unleashed; this became known as the Battle of Wounded Knee.17
 14. Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2
 (January 1978), pp. 167-214. This dilemma is also captured by the notion of the "reciprocal fear
 of surprise attack" in Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard Univer-
 sity Press, 1980), pp. 207-208.
 15. Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," pp. 187-205.
 16. This comes from Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War, 2nd ed. (Princeton: Princeton Uni-
 versity Press, 1961), p. 525, cited in Stephen Van Evera, "Causes of War," Ph.D. diss. (University
 of California at Berkeley, 1984), pp. 40-41, where other examples of inadvertence can be found.
 17. Sagan, The Limits of Safety, p. 263, describes this and other examples of accidental escalation.
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 The security dilemma notion captures how insecurity in certain situations
 can lead to unintended outcomes.
 ORGANIZATIONS: TRADITIONAL APPROACH
 A third perspective on accidents and escalation derives from organization
 theory applied to professional military bureaucracies. There are two variants:
 one that is quite common in the literature I will call "traditional," while a
 second relies on a cultural perspective. The traditional view of militaries is
 that, like all organizations, they seek to maximize autonomy and size and to
 reduce uncertainty.18 In the armed forces, these tendencies are expected to
 produce certain common characteristics, such as that militaries will prefer
 offensive strategies and that they will resist civilian intervention in opera-
 tional planning and implementation.19 The underlying premise of the tradi-
 tional perspective is that similarly structured organizations with similar func-
 tions should have similar interests and behavior.20
 In a general sense, the traditional perspective expects escalation because
 restraint contradicts the very nature of autonomy-seeking, offense-oriented,
 war-winning military organizations. Research has indicated that soldiers do
 not necessarily desire war, but that after the war is under way, professional
 warriors do seek operational autonomy and are inclined to use all means at
 their disposal. Gradualism and restraint can cost lives and are inconsistent
 with such hallowed military principles as concentration of force and the goal
 of total victory.21 From a traditional organizational perspective, there is little
 reason to expect any dampening of escalation based on organizational influ-
 18. Allison, Essence of Decision, pp. 67-100.
 19. Building on Allison's work, this is the interpretation given by Posen, Sources of Military
 Doctrine, pp. 41-59; Jack Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision-Making and the
 Disasters of 1914 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), pp. 24-25; Stephen Van Evera, "Why
 Cooperation Failed in 1914," in Kenneth Oye, ed., Cooperation Under Anarchy (Princeton: Prince-
 ton University Press, 1986), p. 97; Van Evera, "Causes of War," esp. chapter 7; Leon Sigal,
 Fighting to a Finish: The Politics of War Termination in the United States and Japan, 1945 (Ithaca:
 Cornell University Press, 1988), pp. 19-25. Snyder and Van Evera, while emphasizing the
 structural tendencies toward similarities among organizations (e.g., militaries are offense-ori-
 ented), seem to allow for the possibility of a defensive policy, depending on organizational
 essence. The latter view is more compatible with the notion of organizational culture developed
 below. On organizational essence see Morton H. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy
 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1974), p. 28.
 20. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, p. 37 states this most explicitly: "[Organization theory]
 predicts similar behavior of units in the context of similar structures."
 21. Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises.
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 ence.22 This perspective, however, would anticipate that accidents and in-
 advertent escalation are particularly likely in ways that are compatible with
 the standard operating procedures of the armed forces-i.e., where military
 organizations have developed routines for use of a particular means of war-
 fare.23 The proposition that follows from traditional logic is that inadvertent
 escalation is more likely in any means of warfare where military organizations
 have developed routines for use of that means.24
 ORGANIZATIONS: CULTURAL APPROACH
 An organizational culture view of inadvertent escalation predicts a different
 dynamic. In the last decade, culture has emerged as a central concept in
 organizational research, primarily in the field of business management.25 The
 reason for this development was dissatisfaction with existing structural and
 functional organizational studies such as those found in the traditional ap-
 proach discussed above. More specifically, analysts were puzzled why Jap-
 anese firms performed so differently (i.e., better) when their formal structures
 were so similar to those of Western companies. Many have contended that
 the answer is organizational culture: the pattern of assumptions, ideas, and
 beliefs that prescribe how a group should adapt to its external environment
 and manage its internal structure.26
 22. Attesting to this expectation are the discussion and examples on organization theory given
 in Posen, Inadvertent Escalation, pp. 16-19.
 23. For example, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, a routine U-2 mission went ahead as usual,
 but the aircraft strayed off-course over the Soviet Union, contributing to tensions that nearly
 led to a violent U.S.-Soviet clash. This and other examples are given in Allison, Essence of
 Decision, p. 141.
 24. Van Evera, "Causes of War," chapter 7, presents a detailed case on how the organizational
 dynamics of militaries favor escalation.
 25. For an overview of the early evolution of the concept of organizational culture, see William
 G. Ouchi and Alan L. Wilkins, "Organizational Culture," Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 11
 (1985), pp. 457-483; more recently see Peter J. Frost, et al., eds., Reframing Organizational Culture
 (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1991). In security studies, the concept of culture has
 been applied in different ways. See e.g., Ken Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism (New York:
 Holmes and Meier Publishers, Inc., 1979); Jack L. Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture, R-2154-AF
 (Santa Monica, Calif.: The RAND Corporation, 1977); Colin Gray, Nuclear Strategy and National
 Style (Lanham, Md.: Hamilton Press 1986); Carl H. Builder, The Masks of War Analysis (Baltimore:
 Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989). Three notable recent studies are Elizabeth Kier, Culture,
 Politics, and Military Doctrine: France and Britain Between the Wars (manuscript, January 1993);
 Thomas U. Berger, "America's Reluctant Allies: The Genesis of the Political Military Cultures of
 Japan and West Germany," Ph.D. diss. (MIT, 1992); Alastair I. Johnston, "An Inquiry into
 Strategic Culture: Chinese Strategic Thought, The Para Bellum Paradigm, and Grand Strategic
 Choice in Ming China," Ph.D. diss. (University of Michigan, 1993).
 26. The definition given here is loosely based on Edward Schein, Organizational Culture and
 Leadership (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1985), p. 9. Large organizations are rarely
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 Organizational culture deserves attention because it has an autonomous
 influence on the preferences of military services and ultimately on those of
 states. Cultures are not simply reducible to the desires of individuals who
 guide organizations, nor to the environmental circumstances in which they
 exist. Organizational cultures are more than the individuals that run the
 organizations, in two senses. First, culture is a collectively held phenomenon.
 It is not generally the reflection of a single leader nor is it some simple
 mathematical aggregation of many individual beliefs. Second, instead of
 individuals changing cultures, the reverse is usually the case: people are
 socialized by the beliefs that dominate the organizations of which they are
 part.27 Those who heed the prevailing norms are rewarded and promoted.
 Those who do not are given little authority or are fired.28
 Cultures are also not mere weathervanes to environmental forces or to
 "strategic rationality."29 The number of large companies that have failed to
 adapt to market changes are legion.30 Organizational beliefs often determine
 which external circumstances get attention and how costs and benefits are
 weighed. Cultures act as a heuristic for organizational development, much
 the same way a theoretical paradigm can shape intellectual thought. They
 provide a limiting lens for interpreting and selecting what is important amidst
 uncertainty.31 Environmental data and facts which contradict culture will be
 characterized by one culture, but have several. Often, however, especially when the organization
 is hierarchically ordered, a dominant culture provides the main creed.
 27. One theorist has noted that one "does not live for months or years in a particular position
 in an organization, exposed to some streams of communication, shielded from others, without
 the most profound effects upon what he knows, believes, attends to, hopes, wishes, emphasizes,
 fears, and proposes." Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior, 3rd ed. (New York: Free Press,
 1976), p. xvi.
 28. For many years, failure to wear a white shirt and dark suit at IBM had hazardous conse-
 quences for an employee's career. The company has no written policy on attire. But according
 to one former executive, there was "an unwritten dress code that's as effective as if it were
 engraved in steel-or as if it had a loaded gun behind it." See F.G. "Buck" Rodgers, The IBM
 Way (New York: Harper and Row, 1986).
 29. The issue of where culture comes from and how it changes is a broad topic that is generally
 outside the scope of this paper. I do, however, provide some evidence below that military
 cultures are not simply a product of the strategic circumstances these organizations confront.
 For a more extensive discussion of organizational innovation see Barbara Levitt and James G.
 March, "Organizational Learning," Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 14 (1988), pp. 319-340.
 30. Many try to change their cultures by large-scale personnel changes at the top. See Thomas
 C. Hayes, "Faltering Companies Seek Outsiders," New York Times, January 18, 1993, pp. Cl and
 C4.
 31. Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky, Culture and Risk (Berkeley: University of California
 Press, 1982), argue that the risks people face and the ways risks are assessed are a product of
 an earlier cultural choice.
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 discounted as deviant and will be discarded. Likewise, resources are chan-
 neled to methods suited to culture, which consequently appear more feasible
 than those deprived of funding and attention.32 Finally, cultures persist for
 utilitarian reasons: it can be difficult and expensive to reorient operational
 philosophy, especially in a large and complex organization.33
 The organizational culture view posits that the pattern of assumptions,
 ideas, and beliefs that prescribe how a military bureaucracy should conduct
 battle will influence state preferences and actions on the use of that means.34
 Each service, repeatedly faced with tough decisions about how, where, and
 when to employ violence, develops a culture that sets priorities and allocates
 resources.35 Where the traditional approach would expect all organizational
 activities to be equally likely to result in inadvertent escalation, the cultural
 variant contends that accidents and escalation are likely in those means
 compatible with beliefs about the "right way" to fight wars. These "para-
 digms" provide maps for action that either advocate or ignore specific means
 of warfare. Those means compatible with the dominant war-fighting culture
 will be developed and advocated by the military. In such areas doctrine,
 preparations, and intelligence will be geared towards use, not restraint.
 Furthermore, those accidents that do occur will be seized on as proof of
 intentional enemy use or of an unavoidable intensification of the war that
 must be met in kind or bettered. In those types of warfare that are incom-
 patible with the dominant culture, there will be little planning and advocacy
 for their use.36 More attention will be given to avoiding accidents; those that
 32. This is the "competency trap" where experience with, and sunk costs in, a certain technology
 or means make it seem better even if alternatives are actually superior. See Levitt and March,
 "Organizational Learning," p. 322.
 33. David Kreps asserts that corporate culture, even if some costs are involved, has a beneficial
 functional role of facilitating communication and coordination. David M. Kreps, "Corporate
 Cultures and Economic Theory," in James E. Alt and Kenneth A. Schepsle, eds., Perspectives on
 Positive Political Economy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 90-143.
 34. The degree of impact a particular organization will have on executive decisions seems to
 vary along at least three dimensions: 1) the extent to which it has monopoly power on issue
 expertise; 2) the complexity of its responsibilities; and 3) the time period available for action.
 Militaries are particularly influential in wartime because they generally have monopoly control
 over expertise on the use of force, military operations are complex and not easily understood
 by non-specialists, and time periods for altering pre-arranged plans are limited. For a more
 detailed discussion of this topic, see Legro, Cooperation Under Fire.
 35. Organizational cultures can be discerned in a variety of sources including interviews, the
 memoirs of participants, doctrinal development, organizational correspondence, planning doc-
 uments, and internal exercises.
 36. For example, the traditional viewpoint has difficulty explaining the defensive orientation of
 some militaries (e.g., the French Army) in the interwar period. For an excellent analysis of this
 issue, see Kier, Culture, Politics, and Military Doctrine.
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 do occur will be accepted as such and managed so as to avert an escalation
 spiral. In short, the organizational culture perspective predicts a direct-
 albeit subtle-link between military beliefs and customs and the likelihood
 of inadvertent escalation.
 World War II: Submarines, Bombing, and Chemical Weapons
 Each of these perspectives on inadvertent escalation tells a different story of
 why states unintentionally cross fire-breaks in the midst of an on-going
 conflict. How the four approaches account for the actions of the two main
 antagonists of World War 11-Britain and Germany-is examined below in
 more detail. The cases deal with three areas of combat-submarine attacks
 on non-combatants, the bombing of civilians, and chemical warfare-that
 were taboo means of combat during the interwar period. These cases all
 occurred within the same conflict, and therefore differences in what was at
 stake cannot explain the outcomes. They include both situations where in-
 advertent escalation took place as well as when it did not.
 These cases involve two aspects of accidents: their origins and their con-
 sequences. In the submarine warfare section, the main focus is on origins
 and covers three situations that had different outcomes: an accident that
 broke a taboo, an accident did not involve taboos, and an "accident waiting
 to happen" that was avoided. With regard to strategic bombing and chemical
 warfare, the main interest is the consequences of the accidents: why did
 some lead to escalation while others did not? I pay more theoretical attention
 to organizational culture because it is a newcomer and untested; nonetheless,
 evidence for competing explanations is considered, particularly when they
 offer a compelling contrasting prediction of the event.
 SUBMARINE WARFARE: ACCIDENT VS. NON-EVENT
 The submarine in World War II became known as the "viper of the sea" and
 its use against merchant and passenger ships was reviled. At the London
 Naval Conference of 1930, rules that had been formulated and generally
 approved at the 1922 Washington Naval Conference were accepted into
 international law. These rules prohibited submarines from sinking merchant
 or passenger ships without providing for the safety of the crews and passen-
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 gers.37 This hampered the submarine somewhat because it might be vulner-
 able to aircraft and other ships when heeding the required search and safety
 provisions. Nonetheless, all the major powers supported the treaty. Despite
 the collapse of other negotiations and agreements, in 1936 the major pow-
 ers-including Britain and Germany-reaffirmed their commitment to the
 rules in the London Protocol.
 A close inspection of three situations of submarine warfare involving Ger-
 many and Britain suggests how organizational culture can generate accidents.
 The most infamous accident of World War II submarine combat was the
 sinking of the passenger liner Athenia by a German U-boat at the start of
 hostilities. In the second case, one British submarine sank another, and the
 third was a historical non-event: a British submarine adhered to the rules
 despite strong incentives to torpedo a German liner. The four approaches
 offer different predictions on these cases. Clausewitz's friction thesis would
 anticipate an equal likelihood of escalation, given that the situations were
 comparable in intensity, complexity, and uncertainty (e.g., clarity of battle
 instructions and ability to identify friend or foe). Similarly, traditional orga-
 nization theory would also predict escalation in all cases because both navies
 had organizational routines torpedoing ships and were eager to join the
 fight. Conversely, the security dilemma image would predict no accidental
 escalation: the submarines faced neither use-'em-or-lose-'em nor preemption
 incentives. That is, they were not put at risk themselves by not attacking but
 instead waiting to confirm the identity of the enemy as either combatant or
 civilian, as directed by international law.
 Organizational culture provides the best explanation in that it correctly
 predicts that there would be escalation in Germany where unrestricted at-
 tacks were central to naval warfare thinking, but not in Britain where the
 Royal Navy belittled the value and threat of anti-trade submarine warfare.
 Here is what happened.
 GERMANY S SUBMARINE ACCIDENT. When Germany started World War II by
 attacking Poland, strict orders had been issued to the U-boats that the war
 was to be conducted with meticulous restraint towards merchant and pas-
 senger ships in accordance with international agreements. Hitler hoped to
 37. Richard Dean Burns, "Regulating Submarine Warfare, 1921-1941: A Case Study in Arms
 Control and Limited War," Militany Affairs, Vol. 35 (April 1971), pp. 56-62; Janet Manson,
 Diplomatic Ramifications of Unre'stricted Submarine Warfare, 1939-1941 (New York: Greenwood
 Press, 1990), pp. 33-52.
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 avoid conflict with Britain and America.38 In World War I, unrestricted attacks
 by German underwater boats had increased animosities with the former and
 led to hostilities with the latter, a development that significantly contributed
 to Germany's defeat.39 Hitler hoped to avert a repetition of history and
 therefore required restrictions on submarine warfare.
 At the start of hostilities, eighteen of Germany's twenty six ocean-going
 U-boats had already taken up action stations around the British Isles.40 One of
 the submarines was Joseph Lemp's U-30 on patrol 250 miles northwest of
 Ireland. On the evening of September 3, 1939, the day Britain declared war,
 Lemp located a potential target and identified it as enemy. The vessel was
 indeed British, but it was the passenger liner Athenia. The crew aboard the
 Athenia knew that war had been declared, but they did not worry about
 U-boat attacks because they believed the ship was protected by the London
 Protocol.41 Lemp's U-30, however, spit out two torpedoes that burst the
 vessel. 1088 passengers took to lifeboats, 112 went to the bottom. The sinking
 of the Athenia contributed to the onset of unrestricted submarine warfare.42
 How can this incident be explained? It is probable that the "fog of war"
 had something to do with it. The young captain Lemp was probably tense
 in the face of possible enemy contact and not thinking as clearly as he might
 have been. It is unlikely that he purposely blasted a passenger liner. Since
 accidents are inherently undesired and are more likely in times of tension
 and confusion, it is difficult to "falsify" Clausewitz's friction thesis. Maybe
 Lemp just made a mistake. But simply to blame "operator error" is to conflate
 human presence with causation.43 We must ask if there was evidence to
 suggest that factors other than pure chance under complexity were at work,
 38. F.H. Hinsley, Hitler's Strategy (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1951), pp.
 4-9.
 39. Ernest R. May, The World War and American Isolationism, 1914-1917 (Cambridge: Harvard
 University Press, 1959), pp. 113-136.
 40. Oberkommando des Kriegsmarine, "Chronik des Seekriegs: Heft 1 (1939 and 1940)," Berlin,
 PG 32610B, Roll 4078, National Archives, Washington, D.C. (hereafter NA).
 41. Edwin P. Hoyt, Death of the U-Boats (New York: McGraw-Hill Co, 1988), pp. 15-16.
 42. Britain claimed that the incident was intentional and implemented its own set of defensive
 measures, some of which were violations of the spirit if not the letter of the London Protocol.
 German submariners used the British measures to argue to their superiors that they must be
 allowed to attack merchant vessels without restrictions. Germany was largely doing so against
 Britain by October of 1939, while Britain did not do so against Germany until the spring of 1940.
 43. When accidents happen there is a tendency to focus on human error as a cause, rather than
 on other underlying causes that would tend to produce incidents regardless of the individual
 involved. See Perrow, Normal Accidents, pp. 9, 23-30, 330-331, 339.
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 and whether certain predilections tended to push randomness and human
 fallibility in a particular direction.
 The environment of combat that evening was not particularly suited to
 "friction" in the form of Lemp's misidentification. Although Clausewitz had
 much more in mind than the weather, the analogy of "fog" does not fit.144
 The evening was clear, making misidentification unlikely. Nonetheless, Lemp
 claimed that he thought the Athenia was an auxiliary cruiser because it was
 zig-zagging and showing no lights, neither of which was true. Furthermore,
 Lemp's U-boat closed to such a short distance that it could not easily have
 missed the outline of the safety boats and the lack of guns that marked the
 ship as a passenger liner.45 Hitler's demand for restraint was also clearly
 communicated to the U-boat commanders. The submarines went to sea with
 orders to heed the submarine rules, and this order had been repeated at the
 very outset of World War 11.46 Finally, there were no strong security dilemma
 incentives to escalate: the Nazi submarines were not at risk by avoiding
 attacks on non-combatants and would still be able to impair British trade if
 they decided to do so at a later time.47 In Lemp's particular case there is no
 evidence that he thought the Athenia had detected that his U-boat was in the
 area. Thus the source of the U-30's action was not a perceived "us or them"
 dilemma as if, for example, the Athenia had been a cruiser that spotted the
 U-boat, forcing Lemp to choose to kill or be killed. Neither friction nor the
 security dilemma accurately capture the dynamics of the Athenia accident.
 44. Clausewitz, On War, p. 120 writes, "One [source of friction], for example, is the weather.
 Fog can prevent the enemy from being seen in time, a gun from firing when it should, a report
 from reaching the commanding officer. Rain can prevent a battalion from arriving, make another
 late by keeping it not three, but eight hours on the march, ruin a cavalry charge by bogging the
 horses down in mud, etc."
 45. Manson, Diplomatic Ramifications, pp. 64-66 and note 44; Peter Padfield, Donitz: The Last
 Fuhrer (London: Golanz Ltd., 1984), p. 191.
 46. The orders were laid out to the commanders as they put to sea in August and Donitz
 reminded his captains of that order by wire on September 3, 1939. See "Opbefehl Nr. 2 fur U-
 Boote 'Alarmiubung Nordsee' (U27, U30), Kiel 21.8.39," PG32012-NID, NA; Padfield, Donitz,
 p. 191.
 47. They were more vulnerable by following the rules than by not doing so; however, restraint
 was central to Hitler's grand strategy. With immediate unrestricted warfare, the U-boats could
 have scored a few easier kills right at the beginning before Britain could organize its convoys
 and defensive measures, but no significant strategic advantage was expected from such action.
 Germany only had some 26 ocean-going U-boats at the start of war, just one-third of which
 could normally be on station at a time. Donitz argued 300 would be needed to get the job done.
 See "Gedanken uiber den Aufbau der U-Bootswaffe," Memo by Donitz, September 3, 1939, RM
 7/891, Bundesarchiv-Militararchiv, Freiburg, Germany (hereafter, BA-MA).
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 From an organizational culture perspective, however, the incident is less
 puzzling. The culture of the U-boat corps of which Lemp was a part is central
 to his subsequent "mistake. "48 To a degree not seen in any other country,
 Germany had a vibrant pro-submarine culture within its maritime forces.49
 Even though this culture was suppressed for a good part of the interwar
 period due to international treaties and internal politics, the submarine ranks
 served as a magnet for some of the most ambitious and talented officers in
 the Navy. Karl Donitz, commander of the U-boats, sought to infuse his men
 with an offensive, anything-is-possible spirit. He led the revival of the World
 War I U-boat doctrine based on an anti-trade offensive, one that seemed at
 odds with the pledge to adhere to the submarine rules.50
 In light of this culture, the Athenia incident is not surprising. Lemp was
 zealously implementing his training. Germany's "sea wolves" were first and
 foremost taught to be aggressive, and not to miss opportunities.51 The notion
 of differentiating attacks was not ingrained in the training of the
 U-boat mariners, which is why they had to be given instructions on the eve
 of war that explained the procedures for heeding the submarine rules.52 But
 Lemp violated the restrictions by sinking the Athenia in a situation where
 there was every reason, except organizational predisposition, to show re-
 straint.53
 48. In this case, as in others where the military's preferred way of war favors use and escalation,
 the distinctions between cultural and traditional organization theory arguments are not discern-
 ible and therefore I do not address the latter.
 49. Germany also had a strong battleship culture. But the submarine had a respected tradition
 and valued role. This contrasts sharply with the interwar experience of countries such as the
 United States and Britain, which ignored the underwater boat, despite its potential value in a
 war with Japan.
 50. Terrence Robertson, Night Raider of the Atlantic (New York: Dutton, 1956), p. 16; Befehlshaber
 der Unterseeboat, Kriegstagebuch, September 15, 1939, RM 87/3, BA-MA; Karl Donitz, Memoirs:
 Ten Years and Twenty Days, trans. R.H. Stevens (New York: World, 1959), pp. 12-13. Padfield,
 Donitz, pp. 158-160.
 51. Padfield, Donitz, p. 196.
 52. See testimony of Fregattenkapitan Hessler (Donitz's son-in-law) at Nuremburg. Trial of the
 Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremburg: Vol. XIII (New York:
 AMS Press, 1971), p. 528.
 53. One naval staff member advocated giving submarines permission to sink darkened ships
 without any warning. Due to the "political situation," the possibility that another incident would
 generate international opposition, this could not be completely approved. The suggestion was
 made that the Navy leadership give its "silent approval" to attack darkened ships in areas where
 only British vessels operated. The one condition was that the submarines had to claim in their
 war diaries that any sunken merchant vessels had been mistaken for warships. This is what
 Lemp claimed and what Padfield, Donitz, p. 193, says was official Navy policy in such situations.
 See "Forderungen des B.d.U. und militarische Moglichkeiten der Durchfiihrung," September
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 When news of the Athenia's destruction reached Germany on the day that
 Britain declared war, Hitler and Raeder, the head of the Navy, were con-
 vinced that it could not have been caused by a German U-boat, given the
 aims of the Third Reich and the explicit instructions issued. Only Donitz,
 the trainer of the U-boat captains and crews, thought that it might very well
 have been one of his captains, despite instructions, who sank the passenger
 liner.54 The U-boats' war-fighting dogma meant that such an "accident" could
 be expected.
 BRITAIN S SUBMARINE ACCIDENT AND NON-EVENT. Britain's behavior in sub-
 marine warfare contrasts sharply with that of Germany. The Royal Navy had
 dramatically different beliefs about the utility of the submarine. In Britain,
 the battleship was considered the "final arbiter" of naval combat and it
 dominated the war-fighting culture of the British Navy.55 This culture, em-
 bodied in doctrine and plans, belittled submarine warfare, particularly
 against commerce. The underwater boat was regarded as the tool of weaker
 powers, not of mighty Britain.56 Sight unseen, the submarine could strike
 without warning at undefended merchant vessels and even at the proud
 warships. Not only was it a threat to the war fleet, but it also required that
 warships be engaged in less heady tasks, such as accompanying convoys,
 when they otherwise would be seeking battle. The Royal Navy did not train
 submariners nor develop boats to attack commerce. Submarines were meant
 to be used primarily for intelligence and, when they were lucky enough to
 get the opportunity, occasional attacks on enemy warships.57
 22, 1939, RM 7/844, BA-MA. Donitz and Wagner testified at Nuremburg that this memo was
 written by a staff officer and that the Navy never forwarded such an order.
 54. Anthony Martienssen, Hitler and His Admirals (New York: Dutton, 1949), p. 23. The leaders
 did not find out what actually happened until Lemp returned from patrol at the end of the
 month.
 55. "Final Report of the Post-War Questions Committee," March 27, 1920, ADM 1/8586, Public
 Records Office, Kew, UK (PRO) as cited in Stephen W. Roskill, Naval Policy Between the Wars,
 Vol. I: The Period of Anglo-American Antagonism, 1919-1929 (London: Collins, 1968), p. 115.
 56. The origin of this bias was not simply geo-strategic advantage; i.e. that Britain was an island
 power dependent on sea trade confronting Germany, a continental state that was less vulnerable
 to sea interdiction. After all, the Royal Navy's main expected opponent until the late 1930s was
 Japan, a country very vulnerable to an anti-commerce campaign. Nonetheless, despite the fact
 that the UK did not have and could not afford the battleships to take on Japan in the Pacific,
 the Navy did not seriously consider using cheaper submarines to blockade the island.
 57. The British believed that the submarine was not a threat to battleships because U-boats
 would be detected with the sonar device called "ASDIC." But because of the cultural bias
 stressing the inferiority of submarines, ASDIC did not receive adequate critical testing and its
 flaws were not appreciated. David Henry, "'British Submarine Development and Policy, 1918-
 1939," Ph.D. War Studies (King~s College, University of London, 1976); on ASDIC see pp. 320-
 321.
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 The influence of culture on unintended British actions is especially appar-
 ent when contrasted with the German navy's actions. As with Germany and
 the Athenia incident, the first submarine attack by Britain was also an acci-
 dent. On September 10, 1939, the Triton mistakenly torpedoed another En-
 glish submarine, Oxely.58 Like the U-30, the Triton was acting in accordance
 with its organizational culture. Each inadvertently destroyed a ship, but it
 was the type of vessel each had been trained to attack. British submarines
 had a legacy of successful anti-submarine warfare (ASW) in World War 1.59
 In comparison, German strategy was based on an anti-merchant offensive.
 This difference appears to have been reflected even in the physical structure
 of the submarines. The acoustical detection array in German U-boats was
 designed for an anti-shipping role, while in British submarines it was for
 attacking other underwater boats.60 From an organizational culture viewpoint
 it is not surprising that the first "accident" of the war for a British ship was
 the destruction of a friendly submarine, while Lemp's error was an "out of
 bounds" passenger liner.
 The difference between Britain and Germany is just as evident in the
 accidents that did not happen. British submarines incurred no Athenia inci-
 dent despite opportunities.61 For example, when the British submarine
 Salmon sighted the German passenger liner Bremen 2000 yards away on
 December 12, 1939, a replay of the incident involving the Athenia (which had
 been only 800 yards from the U-boat) seemed likely. Yet the Salmon surfaced
 and ordered the ship to stop for the search and seizure procedures that were
 mandated by international law. Unexpectedly, however, a Luftwaffe plane
 appeared and chased the submarine off.62 Ironically, the Bremen was being
 used as a troopship at the time and therefore was a legitimate target, which
 58. The story of this incident is told in A.S. Evans, Beneath the Waves: A History of H.M. Submarine
 Losses (London: William Kinder, 1986), pp. 195-199.
 59. The day before the Oxely was destroyed, Admiral Watson, the commander of the submarine
 force, requested that his boats be used more in an ASW role. "The Use of Submarines in Defence
 of our Trade in the Atlantic," From RA(S) to Secretary of the Admiralty, September 9, 1939,
 ADM 199/1920, PRO.
 60. Rear Admiral G.W.G. Simpson, Periscope View (London: Macmillan London Ltd., 1972),
 p. 61.
 61. The British surface fleet did clear much of the German commerce from the seas at the
 beginning of the conflict.
 62. The captain of the Salmon noted, "I had no special instructions with reference to intercepting
 Bremen and considered myself bound by international law, a rigid adherence to which had been
 specifically stressed to submarine commanding officers at the beginning of war." See "HMS
 Salmon Patrol Report December 2-16, 1939," Memo from Commanding Officer HMS Salmon to
 Captain (S) Third Submarine Flotilla, ADM 199/288, PRO.
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 the Salmon could have easily torpedoed from the safety of the ocean depths.63
 The difference between Britain's and Germany's accidents is inexplicable
 from a traditional organizational perspective. Both navies had adopted the
 London Protocol as part of their organizational rules, but beliefs on how to
 fight a war-and the types of accidents that occurred-diverged. As a cultural
 approach expects, Britain's behavior reinforced its restraint, while Germany's
 provoked an accident that violated taboos.
 STRATEGIC BOMBING: VIOLATIONS IGNORED OR RECIPROCATED
 From 20,000 feet off the ground, the familiar surroundings of life-buildings,
 homes, cars-appear unnaturally small. Perhaps this perspective eased the
 task of the young aviators of World War II who were ordered to flatten the
 homes and habitations of enemy civilians hundreds of miles behind the front
 lines. Although this practice became commonplace during World War II (and
 in many conflicts since), in the 1920s and 1930s it was considered barbaric
 and potentially avoidable. Statesmen made considerable efforts both to re-
 duce air armaments and to find ways to regulate air attacks by agreeing on
 rules and restrictions.64 The main distinction they hoped to enforce was that
 between civilians and combatants. No official treaties were concluded, but
 Britain and Germany were able to reach accord at the beginning of the war
 to avoid bombing undefended civilians and cities.65 That pact retained legit-
 imacy for the first nine months of conflict, but as we will see, it did not
 survive the war.
 In the strategic bombing cases, organizational culture played the pivotal
 part, not necessarily by causing accidents as in the submarine cases above,
 but instead by affecting the responses of states to the incidents-i.e., either
 to use accidents as justification for escalation or, by ignoring them, to reaffirm
 restraint. Consider, for example, the difference in the responses of Germany
 and of Britain to the other side's transgression of a major limitation in the
 air war. In one case, Britain's bombing of the German homeland brought no
 63. Nigel John Gilbert, "British Submarine Operations in WWII," United States Naval Institute
 Proceedings, Vol. 89 (March 1963), p. 73.
 64. These were serious efforts. Britain even considered giving up her most effective means of
 sea warfare, the sea blockade, in exchange for restrictions on air warfare. See especially C.I.D.
 Limitation of Arms Sub-Committee, 2nd Meeting, July 18, 1938, in "Humanization of Air
 Warfare," AIR 9/202, PRO.
 65. Those participating directly in the war effort were generally seen as legitimate targets of air
 power. J.M. Spaight, Air Powe&- and War Rights, 3rd ed. (London: Longmans, Green, 1947),
 pp. 43, 259.
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 comparable response; Germany virtually ignored the event. Yet when Ger-
 many accidentally transgressed a second limitation on the bombing of capital
 cities later in the war, Britain responded immediately. How can these differ-
 ent outcomes be understood?
 Organizational culture predicts correctly that Britain and Germany had
 different ways of warfare that accorded different importance to a strategic
 offensive aimed at civilians. That contrast had a considerable impact on
 decision making and events. The other perspectives are less precise in their
 predictions. The friction hypothesis would anticipate escalation from both
 participants, particularly in light of the technical complexities of navigation
 and precision bombing in the early war period. Likewise, traditional orga-
 nization theory would also expect both to escalate since both the RAF and
 Luftwaffe had organizational capabilities and plans for strategic bombing.
 The security dilemma argument expects similar behavior from the opponents,
 but in the opposite direction, toward restraint: there was not a strong sur-
 prise-attack or preemptive incentive to initiate strategic bombing since no
 single attack could cause a devastating amount of damage, and there were
 few penalties involved in continuing restraint to ascertain if the enemy had
 actually-even if accidentally-violated restrictions. Yet while Germany
 showed restraint, Britain escalated.
 GERMANY S RESPONSE TO BRITAIN S FIRST ATTACKS. On the night of May 11-
 12, 1940, RAF bombers undertook, possibly accidentally, the first strategic
 raid of the war in an attack on Monchen-Gladbach in Germany. Another
 RAF assault on Aachen and Monchen-Gladbach took place on May 14-15.66
 The official go-ahead for the RAF strategic offensive was given on May 15.
 What is of interest here is the German response: there was none. The Ger-
 mans undertook no immediate retaliation, in kind or otherwise, against
 Britain, neither for the earlier, possibly accidental, raids, nor in response to
 the approved offensive after May 15. The British history of the Luftwaffe
 points out that in the entire 1940 Western campaign through the fall of France,
 66. Because the Cabinet was debating on a daily basis whether to undertake these raids, H.W.
 Koch, "The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany: The Early Phase, May-September 1940,"
 The Historical Journal, Vol. 34, No. 1 (1991), p. 127, has speculated that Bomber Command acted
 on its own authority. The evidence, however, is not conclusive. The fact that little irritation was
 expressed at the Cabinet meeting on May 15 when the Secretary of State for Air mentioned the
 May 14-15 raids suggests that, at least by that date, some sort of limited operation was approved.
 See W.M. (40) 123, Conclusions, Minute 2, May 15, 1940, CAB 65/13, PRO; Martin Middlebrook
 and Chris Everitt, The Bomber Command War Diaries: An Operational Reference Book 1939-1945,
 p. 42.
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 German bombers were not used strategically, except during one four-day
 period in June when they attacked the French aircraft industry in Paris and
 fuel dumps in Marseilles.67 The Nazis were, of course, aware of the RAF's
 attacks as was noted in reports by the security service of the SS.68 Hitler
 himself allegedly dismissed the raids at one point as inadvertent. He assumed
 that the attacks on German territory were the result of someone losing his
 head due to the pressure of the Battle of France, or that the RAF had acted
 on its own. He saw no need to retaliate in kind.69 Despite the fact that it had
 been made clear that its restraint was contingent on reciprocity, Germany
 simply ignored the British actions. Why did reciprocal escalation not occur
 immediately?
 A pivotal factor in this restraint was the organizational culture of the
 Luftwaffe. Unlike the RAF, Luftwaffe faith in strategic bombing-particularly
 in a civilian-targeted morale bombing campaign-never took hold. Ger-
 many's strategic culture, of which the Luftwaffe was a part, was land-ori-
 ented and heavily influenced by a traditional army outlook. Like the RAF,
 the Luftwaffe was an independent service in the sense that it was organi-
 zationally separate from the Army and Navy and not subordinate to their
 orders. Nonetheless, cultures often run deeper than formal structures and
 the Luftwaffe was constrained by Germany's continental orientation to com-
 bat. The German Air Force did not prepare equipment or plans to wage the
 type of large-scale air assault required for bombing and particularly for an
 unrestricted campaign. Instead, doctrine was oriented more towards sup-
 porting the land battle.70 Even the German heavy bombers best suited for
 67. British Air Ministry, The Rise and Fall of the German Air Force, 1933-1945 (New York: St.
 Martin's Press, 1983 ed.), p. 72. There is, however, a debate on whether the prior German
 attacks on Warsaw and Rotterdam were against "defended" cities and thus permissible or were
 instead simply illegitimate terror raids. E.g., see Olaf Groehler, "The Strategic Air War and its
 Impact on the German Civilian Population," pp. 282-283; cf. Horst Boog, "The Luftwaffe and
 Indiscriminate Bombing up to 1942," p. 386, in Horst Boog, ed., The Conduct of the Air War in
 the Second World War: An International Comparison (New York: Berg Publishers Ltd., 1992).
 68. See Koch, "The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany," p. 127.
 69. As reported by General Warlimont to Walter Ansel, Hitler Confronts England (Durham, N.C.:
 Duke University Press, 1960), p. 113.
 70. Williamson Murray, The Luftwaffe (Baltimore: Nautical and Aviation Publishing Co. of Amer-
 ica, 1985), esp. pp. 1-23, argues that Germany did have a strategic bomber emphasis. My view
 is that while a strategic mission-oriented sub-culture certainly remained a part of the Luftwaffe,
 it did not take root and dominate the organization as in Britain. German planning and operations
 consistently listed the hierarchy of Luftwaffe's aims as: 1) the destruction of enemy airpower;
 then 2) support of the Army and Navy; and finally 3) tasks which might be considered strategic
 bombing. See "Instructions of the Commander of the Air Force for the Conduct of Operations
 in the Initial Period of War," November 18, 1935, as reprinted in Karl-Heinz V6lker, Dokumente
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 strategic bombing were required to have dive-bombing capabilities, a speci-
 fication that hindered their strategic bombing effectiveness.71 Thus when
 Britain's bombs fell on the Ruhr in the spring of 1940, Germany ignored
 them. The Luftwaffe was absorbed fulfilling its established role of helping
 the ground forces advance in assault on France. Even when France was
 defeated and the Luftwaffe was no longer occupied with its part in that
 victory, German restraint in strategic bombing endured.72
 BRITAIN S RESPONSE TO GERMANY S ACCIDENTAL RAID ON LONDON. Compare
 the German reaction to escalation with the British response to an accidental
 German raid that appeared to breach the restraint still in effect on bombing
 capital cities. On the night of August 24, 1940, twelve German bombers
 overshot their intended targets consisting of aircraft factories and oil refiner-
 ies located at Rochester and Thameshaven, twenty miles east of London.
 Instead they dropped their loads on London, setting off a chain of reprisals
 that ended any hope for restraint in strategic bombing in the Second World
 War.73
 Britain did not ignore the event as Germany had done in Britain's bombing,
 but instead seized on it as an act that required response in kind. The next
 day Churchill called for retaliation and some 100 bombers were dispatched
 against Berlin. Webster and Frankland's Strategic Air Offensive explains that
 escalation was motivated by the prime minister's desire that "the Germans
 get as good as they were giving. "74 Perhaps in the heat of battle (with its
 und Dokumnentarfotos zur Geschichte der Deutschen Luftwaffe (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags Anstalt,
 1968), esp. p. 478; "Aufmarsch- und Kampfanweisungen der Luftwaffe: Weisungen fur den
 Einsatz gegen Osten," May 1939, RL 2 II/ 21, BA-MA; Fuhrer War Directive No. 16, "Preparations
 for a Landing Operation Against England," July 16, 1940.
 71. Richard J. Overy, "From 'Uralbomber' to 'Amerikabomber': The Luftwaffe and Strategic
 Bombing," Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 1, No. 2 (September 1978), pp. 168-169; Edward L.
 Homze, Arming the Luftwaffe: The Reich Air Ministry and the German Aircraft Industry, 1919-1939
 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1976), pp. 63-68.
 72. Strategic rationality partially accounts for this decision: Hitler sought a peace with Britain
 so that he could turn his forces toward the East. But this does not explain why, even after it
 became clear in July of 1940 that Britain would not yield and Germany would have to fight, the
 Luftwaffe's assignment was first to defeat the RAF, then to assist the army and navy in an
 invasion. Terror bombing was to be used only in retaliation.
 73. Koch, "The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany," p. 137; Boog, "The Luftwaffe and
 Indiscriminate Bombing to 1942," p. 389. The Fuhrer was enraged that his orders had been
 disregarded, even if it was an accident. As punishment, the bomber crews responsible were
 sent to the infantry. This punishment contrasts sharply with the minimal rebuke that Lemp
 received for violating the submarine rules by torpedoing the Athenia. Cajus Bekker, The Luftwaffe
 War Diaries (New York: Doubleday, 1968), p. 172.
 74. Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive, 1939-1945 (London: Her
 Majesty's Stationery Office [HMSO], 1961), p. 152.
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 attendant "fog"), Churchill simply did not understand that the German action
 was inadvertent. There is evidence to suggest, however, that Churchill was
 aware that this was an accident and was looking for an excuse to start city
 bombing. Britain may have known from intercepted messages that Hitler
 had forbidden the Luftwaffe to bomb London.75 Yet even without such
 intelligence, there was good reason to suspect an accident. The unintended
 foray involved twelve planes which caused light damage and only four
 fatalities, hardly the type of decisive operation to be expected from a pur-
 poseful breach of this important limitation.76 Churchill himself had earlier
 downplayed the gravity of the German raids, noting that very few people
 were affected by any one attack.77 Moreover, in July, well before the German
 assault, Churchill had already shown an interest in bombing Berlin. At that
 time he expressed interest in being able to respond to German attacks on
 London. But he also gave a planning date of September 1, suggesting that
 his intentions were not necessarily dependent on German actions.78
 Why did Britain decide to escalate, breaking the last taboo against strategic
 bombing? This is a question of considerable historical controversy and not
 one easily answered with the evidence available. While there are many
 arguments about what motivated Churchill (not the least of which was his
 personal predilection to seize the initiative), what is clear is that his outlook
 and options were influenced by RAF culture.79 From the end of World War
 75. David Irving, Churchill's War: The Struggle for Power (Australia: Veritas Publishing Co. 1987),
 p. 365, especially note 30. This information is based on an interview with R.V. Jones that is not
 corroborated. However, it is not unthinkable that such knowledge was gleaned from intercepts
 of the signals traffic of the Luftwaffe. See F.H. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World
 War, Volume I: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations (New York: Cambridge University Press,
 1979), pp. 179-182.
 76. Harvey B. Tress, British Strategic Bombing Policy Through 1940: Politics, Attitudes, and the
 Formation of a Lasting Pattern (Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen Press, 1988), p. 68.
 77. Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, Vol. VI: Finest Hour, 1939-1941 (London: Heinemann,
 1983), pp. 602-603.
 78. Minute to Secretary of State for Air and CAS from Prime Minister, July 20, 1940, AIR 19/
 458, PRO; Minute from Director Home Office and CAS, July 21, 1940, AIR 19/458, PRO. Churchill
 also noted the desirability of waiting, in case of the need to target Berlin, for longer nights and
 the arrival of the new Stirling bombers. Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, Vol. VI, p. 673. Churchill
 invited Portal, the head of Bomber Command, to his country home to discuss the idea on July
 20 and August 17. See Irving, Churchill's War, pp. 371, 403.
 79. George Quester, Deterrence Before Hiroshima: The Airpower Background of Modern Strategy (New
 York: Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1966), pp. 117-118, suggests a strategic rationale for escalation. At
 the time, Fighter Command was under pressure due to Luftwaffe attacks. Churchill recognized
 that command of the air was the key to Britain's defense: if Fighter Command failed, Britain
 was lost. Thus to buy Fighter'Command breathing room, it is argued, Churchill purposely
 attacked Berlin in order to draw the Luftwaffe's attacks on the British capital and away from
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 I, Britain's Air Force had promoted and institutionalized a philosophy of
 strategic bombing, whose central tenets were that the best way either to
 prevent or to win a war would be to threaten or launch a massive assault on
 the enemy's sources of power. This included both depriving the enemy of
 the physical means to fight and breaking its morale to continue the battle.
 Hugh Trenchard, the Chief of the Air Staff (CAS), had no doubt about which
 was more important: "The moral effect of bombing stands undoubtedly to
 the material effect in a proportion of 20 to 1."8? This philosophy, effectively
 cultivated in the organization, was well-suited to unrestricted warfare. A
 The RAF's preferences made themselves felt in a number of ways. Air
 Force officials had been directly lobbying for escalation since the invasion of
 France, arguing that the battle had to be taken to the German homeland.
 RAF Intelligence boldly asserted that large "moral effects" were resulting
 from its bombing operations, a conclusion that seems to have been driven
 more by wishful thinking than objective evidence. Influenced by these ar-
 guments, the Chiefs of Staff (COS) concluded on May 25, 1940, that Germany
 might be beaten by economic pressure, the bombing of economic and psy-
 chological targets, and the instigation of popular revolt in German-occupied
 territories. By late June, Churchill had picked up on this thinking, arguing
 that airpower would cause Hitler "possibly decisive difficulties" in Germany
 and other areas he had to feed and defend.82 On July 8 he asserted: "There
 is one thing that will bring him back and bring him down and that is an
 absolutely devastating, exterminating attack by very heavy bombers from
 the RAF. This thesis seems plausible with hindsight because it reflects what actually resulted.
 Yet direct evidence to support it is sparse. In addition, as Frederick M. Sallagar, The Road to
 Total War (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., 1969), pp. 181-182, has noted, the decision
 was made at a time, August 24, when Fighter Command was not in terrible shape as it would
 be two weeks later.
 80. Webster and Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive, pp. 46, 55; Neville Jones, The Beginnings
 of Strategic Air Power: A History of the British Bomber Force, 1923-1939 (London: Frank Cass, 1987),
 p. 34.
 81. One way the culture spread was through the selection of personnel. Trenchard was known
 to have kept on only those officers who agreed with him. Robin Higham, The Military Intellectuals
 in Britain: 1918-1939 (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1966), p. 200. Perhaps
 more important, institutions were founded that would propagate the bomber offensive philos-
 ophy, including an air force staff college, a cadet college, technical training schools and other
 facilities.
 82. Webster and Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive, pp. 145-146; Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill,
 Vol. VI, p. 603. On the general issue of RAF bias in intelligence see Harold L. Wilensky,
 Organizational Intelligence: Knowledge and Policy in Government and Industry (New York: Basic Books,
 1967), pp. 24-28.
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 this country upon the Nazi homeland. We must be able to overwhelm them
 by this means, without which I do not see a way through."83
 The organizational culture view suggests that Churchill's views and choices
 were a consequence, not a cause, of organizational planning. His opinion of
 the utility of bombing had evolved from a pre-war history of opposition to,
 and lack of faith in, the independent strategic air offensive aimed at morale. 84
 In May when he became prime minister, Churchill was particularly exposed
 to the organizational lobbying on the few air plans available. Perhaps more
 important, the situation and RAF culture constrained the options available
 to Churchill: Britain was most prepared to strike out at Germany through
 strategic bombing.85 Given the RAF's military advice, the interpretation of
 events, and the limited capabilities available (strategic area bombing),
 Churchill's choice of strategic bombing is largely explained by a cultural
 perspective. Without the RAF's bomber culture, Churchill might well have
 shared Hitler's disposition against unrestricted air operations. The difference
 in the compatibility of each side's air force culture with strategic bombing
 explains why Britain and Germany had opposite responses to incidents that
 violated restrictions on the use of aerial force.
 CHEMICAL WARFARE: BARKING DOGS SILENCED
 Like submarine warfare and strategic bombing, chemical warfare (CW) was
 a forbidden tool of conflict during the interwar years. The limitation of CW
 83. Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, Vol. VI, pp. 655-656. At about the same time (July 17), Portal,
 the Commander-in-Chief (CINC) of Bomber Command, personally advocated unleashing the
 bomber offensive. RAF Narrative, The RAF in the Bombing Offensive Against Germany: Volume II,
 Restricted Bombing September 1939 to May 1941 (Air History Branch, Air Ministry), AIR 41/40,
 p. 117, AIR 41/40, PRO.
 84. At the end of World War I, Churchill doubted that victory could be had by terrorizing
 civilians. Webster and Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive, p. 47. In the 1930s, Churchill
 advocated air defenses as a means of mitigating air attacks. He did not believe the "bomber
 would always get through." See Winston S. Churchill, The Gathering Storm (Boston: Houghton
 Mifflin Co., 1948), pp. 147-152; Tress, British Strategic Bombing, pp. 69-70. In September 1939,
 citing the results of the Spanish Civil War, Churchill doubted that "the essential elements of
 war" would be changed by the air arm. On May 7, 1940, Churchill had opposed unrestricted
 bombing because of Britain's perceived inferiority to Germany in air power. See W.M. (40) 114,
 Conclusions, Minute 1, May 7, 1940, CAB 65/13, PRO. After September 1940, Churchill varied
 between doubt and support for the air offensive. See Maxwell Philip Schoenfeld, The War
 Ministry of Winston Churchill (Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University Press, 1972), pp. 92-101.
 85. But Britain's air power resources could also have been used to attack Germany's invasion
 effort or help with the battle at sea. See Tress, British Strategic Bombing Policy, pp. 215-220. On
 the uses of air power in the Battle of the Atlantic, see Williamson Murray, "The Influence of
 Pre-War Anglo-American Doctrine on the Air Campaigns of the Second World War," in Boog,
 ed., The Conduct of the Air War, pp. 245-246.
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 was discussed at many of the negotiations of that era. But only one treaty-
 the Geneva Protocol of 1925 prohibiting first use of chemical weapons-was
 signed. At the beginning of World War II, Britain and Germany exchanged
 pledges reaffirming their no-first-use commitments. Despite these agree-
 ments, nations expected CW use and went to considerable efforts preparing
 for such combat. CW was widely recognized by all participants in World
 War II to have significant military utility.86 However, throughout the war,
 even though a range of CW accidents occurred, they never led to escalation.
 The friction, traditional organization, and security dilemma perspectives
 all would predict a spiral of use from restricted weapons even if by accident.
 Intense conflict, complex operations, and great uncertainty characterized
 many of the situations where CW incidents occurred. These sources of fric-
 tion helped cause accidents, but did not cause escalation. All of the military
 organizations involved also had plans, troops, and weapons for CW use but,
 contrary to traditional organization theory, their routines did not generate
 escalation. According to the security dilemma argument, both sides should
 have felt insecure due to the surprise-attack advantage of CW, should have
 been poised to strike back to minimize disadvantage, and should have been
 leery of any type of trust in enemy restraint. It was widely acknowledged
 that gas was most effectively used in a surprise attack. For example, General
 Ochsner, the head of German CW in World War II, argued that where
 attacker and defender are equally well prepared, the attacker has the advan-
 tage because of ability to complete preparations, achieve surprise, and choose
 86. This is evident in the analysis and calculations of individual countries and outside experts.
 For example, in Britain a 1939 review of gas requirements concluded that "with added and
 improved weapons chemical troops will be used in a future war more than they were in the
 last." See "Gases for Use in the Field and the Quantity of Each Required," prepared by the
 Director of Military Training and Director of Staff Studies by request of the Intra-service Com-
 mittee on Anglo-French Chemical Warfare Conversations, July 7, 1939, War Office 193/740, PRO.
 From December 1939 tests, the British concluded that, "we have at our disposal a potential
 weapon of great value." See "Chemical Warfare-High Spray Trials," from MO1 to DDMO,
 January 30, 1940, WO 193/726, PRO. Military intellectuals such as B.H. Liddell Hart and J.F.C.
 Fuller were also proponents of CW.
 87. Gas was not, however, a use-it-or-lose-it weapon, nor was CW just an "offensive" weapon.
 It could be used for both offense and defense. Generally it was seen as benefiting those interested
 in inhibiting fast moving operations after it had been introduced to the battlefield. But initial
 use could facilitate an offensive by opening wide gaps in enemy lines, as was the case with
 Germany's first use of CW in World War I. British planners in World War II argued that CW
 might be effective in breaking through enemy lines if the offensive towards Germany were
 stalled in Italy or France. See Joint Planning Staff Memorandum, "Military Considerations
 Affecting the Initiation of Chemical and Other Special Forms of Warfare," July 27, 1944, PREM
 3/89, PRO.
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 the time, place and scale of attack. The defender would be hard pressed to
 keep defenses ready and would have to fight under the most unfavorable
 conditions.88 Inadvertent escalation would seem likely in these circum-
 stances. However, the history of incidents involving chemical warfare in
 World War II-that is, its non-use-challenges this notion. The organizational
 culture approach argues that both Germany and Britain had "ways of war"
 that worked to suppress inadvertent escalation. Indeed, that is what we find.
 BRITAIN AND THE ABSENCE OF CW INADVERTENCE. Of the armed forces of
 Britain affiliated with chemical warfare, none found it a desirable weapon,
 and organizational routines for its use were not accorded the attention and
 funding other areas received. Given their prevailing orthodoxy of war-fight-
 ing, this is not surprising. In the Army, chemical warfare development was
 relatively ignored for three reasons. First, the legacy of gas use in World War
 I had alienated mainstream officers to this form of warfare. They did not like
 the interference of civilian chemists, the special privileges accorded to the
 companies that were tasked to wage CW, and the way that gas complicated
 the traditional battlefield. Second, the Army's conservative approach to in-
 novation worked against the acceptance of chemical weapons. The Army
 was but a loose collection of traditional regiments, like sports or social clubs,
 that soldiers relished as a refuge from social and technological change. Within
 this system, the technical or mechanical officer was looked down upon. Gas
 was a technical weapon. The Director of Artillery was left in charge of
 chemical warfare, yet artillerymen seemed more concerned with their horses
 than with their technical equipment. Finally, the Army had few resources
 and no central war scenario. This inhibited development of weapons like
 CW that were affected by the specific geographical and climatological con-
 ditions of the area in which they would be used.89
 88. Lt. General Herman Ochsner, History of German Chemical Warfare in World War II, Part I: The
 Military Aspect, P-004a (Historical Office of the Chief of the [U.S.] Chemical Corps, 1949), p. 4,
 NA.
 89. See L.F. Haber, The Poisonous Cloud: Chemical Warfare in the First World War (Oxford: Clarendon
 Press, 1986), pp. 269, 273; J.B.S. Haldane, Callinicus: A Defense of Chemical Warfare (New York:
 Dutton, 1925), pp. 34 and 37; Brian Bond, British Military Policy Between the Two World Wars
 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), pp. 35-71, 132; Shelford Bidwell and Dominick Graham,
 Firepower: British Army Weapons and Theories of War 1904-1945 (London: George Allen and Unwin,
 1982); chapter 9, and p. 180; and M.M. Postan, D. Hay, and J.D. Scott, Design and Development
 of Weapons (London: HMSO, 1964) pp. 238-240, 253. It was recognized that the effect of CW
 depended on local weather arid geographic conditions. See CID, "Chemical Warfare Policy,"
 November 1924, p. 15, WO 188/144, PRO.
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 RAF thinking was more compatible with gas use yet CW development was
 in the hands of the Army and it received little attention or advocacy in the
 Air Ministry. The RAF recognized a potential role for CW, but when it
 appeared that CW development would reduce funding for more preferred
 tools, such as bombing with high explosives and incendiaries, the RAF was
 willing to forgo the option.90 The individuals that did advocate CW were
 censured by higher authorities.9' In wartime, and specifically in the decisions
 of 1944, the COS, led by the RAF, did not want their high-explosive and
 incendiary bombing loads cut in favor of gas. The former, they argued, were
 well-tried and known to be effective. Although the bomber offensive was
 not working as intended, the blinders of RAF culture inhibited Britain from
 seeing this.92
 This cultural aversion to CW was reflected in the British military's strong
 interest in avoiding its use. This is a dynamic unanticipated by traditional
 organizational theory, which expects that militaries in war tend to foster
 escalation.93 Yet in several instances, incidents that could have led to CW
 escalation were ignored or purposefully suppressed. The first was in late
 1940 when the War Office received reports from the Middle East that Italy
 was preparing to use gas in Ethiopia. The Commander-in-Chief of Middle
 East Forces suggested that a threat of retaliation in kind be made to deter it.
 The War Office quashed the suggestion, fearing that giving attention to cases
 of possible use without actually retaliating (there was doubt Britain could or
 would) might indicate to Germany that the UK feared a gas war, and thus
 encourage the Nazis to use it. It was decided that should the Italians employ
 90. Also see CID, "The Manufacture of Toxic Gas for Use in War," Memorandum by the War
 Office and Air Staff, July 26, 1938, CAB 4/28, PRO. Paul Harris, "British Preparations for
 Offensive Chemical Warfare, 1935-1939," Royal United Services Institute Journal, Vol. 125, No. 2
 (June 1980), p. 61. For a similar assessment during the war, see CAS to the COS, "Chemical
 Warfare," November 14, 1941, WO 193/711, PRO.
 91. In 1942, Hugh Dowding, CINC of Fighter Command, wrote in a draft of an article that
 "mustard gas should be used in an air attack on Germany." But this view was not approved by
 the COS and he had to delete it. This was noted in a letter from Dowding to Basil Liddell-Hart.
 See B.H. Reid, "Gas Warfare: The Perils of Prediction," in David Carlton and Carlo Schaerf,
 eds., Reassessing Arms Control (London: Macmillan, 1984), p. 153.
 92. See F.H. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War, Vol. III, Part I (New York:
 Cambridge University Press, 1988); pp. 298-307; Wilensky, Organizational Intelligence, pp. 24-28.
 93. This is particularly true in forms of warfare that already have well-developed routines and
 that are non-innovative. CW fit both of these categories. Britain had prepared to use it and had
 already done so extensively in World War I; thus its use was not innovative. In fact, of the three
 means of warfare, strategic bombing was the most radical change from conflict in World War I.
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 gas, the whole matter would be swept under the rug: "Publicity should not
 (repeat not) be given to the fact."94
 The same phenomenon happened in 1942 with respect to reports from the
 Far East that left little doubt that Japan was using gas in China. The Army
 thought that it was best to ignore this use since any British retaliation might
 lead to unrestricted Japanese CW in India, an area that was considered
 vulnerable to gas attacks.95 This was a strategic calculation, but one that was
 defined by a culture hostile to CW use. For even when strategic circumstances
 changed, when India was not at risk in 1944, the COS still refused to accept
 the evidence that the Japanese had used gas.96
 In another example, when the Soviets became worried in the winter of
 1942 that the Germans were readying to unleash a gas war, Stalin asked
 Churchill for help. This was given in the form of a pledge: If the Germans
 used CW against the Russians, the Allies would use CW against the Nazis.
 This idea threw the British military into frenzy. The COS felt the promise
 might lead to immediate chemical warfare. Many were especially upset be-
 cause the United Kingdom had no means to verify whether Soviet claims of
 German use were actually true.97
 A final incident occurred during the German bombing of Bari Harbor in
 Italy in December 1943. One of the Luftwaffe bombs hit a U.S. supply ship,
 the S.S. John Harvey, that was carrying 2,000 100-lb. mustard bombs to be
 used in case CW escalated. The gas was released into the harbor where many
 sailors ended up in the water during the raid. Clouds of the toxic agent
 drifted over the town. Some 1,000 civilians, as well as soldiers, were killed
 at Bari, many from the contaminated water and air. In contrast to Britain's
 reaction to the accidental bombing of London, the Allies did not propagan-
 dize the event or use it as an excuse for retaliation, but instead covered it
 up. Medical reports of wounds were allowed to describe chemical weapon
 injuries only in general terms, and strict censorship was instituted at all
 military bases. When it was clear that the accident could not be kept secret,
 the Combined Chiefs of Staff prepared a statement which reiterated that
 "Allied policy is not (repeat not) to use gas unless or until the enemy does
 94. Telegram from the War Office to the CINC Middle East, December 16, 1940, WO 193/721,
 PRO; "Chemical Warfare: Use of Gas by Italians and Policy for Retaliation," WO 193/725, PRO.
 95. "Japanese Gas Warfare in China," July 14, 1942, WO 193/723, PRO.
 96. Ismay (for COS) to PM, June 28, 1944,. PREM 3/89, PRO.
 97. 11th Meeting of the Defence Committee, April 17, 1942, WO 193/711, PRO.
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 so first but that we are fully prepared to retaliate and do not deny the
 accident, which was a calculated risk."98
 GERMANY AND THE LACK OF INADVERTENT CW. German military culture was
 no more favorable to gas than was Britain's and the effect of unintended
 incidents on escalation was the same: restraint endured. Dating back to
 Moltke, German military thought focused on fast, decisive maneuver and
 encirclement as a means of victory. In World War I, a skeptical military was
 convinced to try gas based on the argument that it would break the stalemate
 of trench warfare.99 It did not. In fact it turned out to be a poor fit with
 Germany's desired operations in World War I because it inhibited mobility
 and impeded the aggressiveness of soldiers. In addition it led to civilian
 interference in military affairs, particularly by officially sanctioned chem-
 ists. '00
 German doctrine on the eve of World War II was decidedly offensive: fast-
 moving and long-range armored and motorized units would spearhead the
 attack, break through the enemy's front, penetrate quickly and deeply into
 the rear, counter enemy efforts to block encirclement or escape, and sever
 communications, supply, and command lines. Infantry divisions would then
 move in for annihilation battle from the front. Chemical weapons, which
 were cumbersome, could play only a limited role in such a strategy. CW
 equipment and munitions would jam supply lines, and chemical casualties
 were difficult to handle: they did not die easily and needed intensive care.
 This was particularly true since the use of gas in offensive operations would
 have demanded centralized control which clashed with the decentralized
 German auftragstaktik system.'0'
 For reasons that differ from Britain's-Germany's later defensive stance,
 the threat to its survival, and the mercurial nature of Hitler, who ignored
 many norms of state behavior-it may seem surprising that the Reich did
 98. Robert Harris and Jeremy Paxman, A Higher Form of Killing: The Secret Story of Chemical and
 Biological Warfare (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982), pp. 119-123.
 99. Robert M. Citino, The Evolution of Blitzkrieg Tactics: Germany Defends Itself Against Poland,
 1918-1933 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1987), p. 81; Matthew Cooper, The German Army
 1933-1945 (New York: Stein and Day, 1978) pp. 139-140; Frederic J. Brown, Chemical Warfare: A
 Study in Restraints (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1968), p. 5.
 100. Haber, The Poisonous Cloud, p. 269, 273. Some of the reasons for the poor fit between
 culture and CW in Germany, as in Britain, are related to factors that traditional organizational
 theorists would stress (for example, a bias towards offense and autonomy), but the outcome-
 restraint-does not fit the predictions of the traditional school.
 101. Ochsner, The History of German CW, p. 5; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
 [SIPRI], The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, Volume I: The Rise of CB Weapons (New
 York: Humanities Press, 1971), p. 307.
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 not reflexively lapse into CW use. Coupled with security dilemma consid-
 erations, such as surprise-use advantages, it is even more curious why there
 was no accidental escalation. Yet from a military culture perspective, the lack
 of escalation is not a puzzle.
 During Germany's invasion of Poland, mustard gas was used in the Polish
 defense of the Jaslo bridge, resulting in several German casualties and deaths.
 Instead of responding in kind, however, the Third Reich's military assumed
 that the Polish Supreme Command had not ordered the use of gas. They
 were right, but the choice seemed more a product of hopeful expectation
 than shrewd analysis.'02 The benign assumption that the Germans made in
 this situation, that the gas use was not intentional, contrasts sharply with
 what Britain concluded about the Luftwaffe raid on London, or Lemp's
 judgment on the status of the Athenia. When the German Foreign Ministry
 wanted to use the incident for propaganda, General Halder was quick to
 squelch the idea. It appears that he, like his British counterparts, was afraid
 it might lead to the initiation of CW.103
 A second incident in July 1941 testifies to the unusual efforts some states
 went to in hopes of avoiding escalation in certain areas. The Soviet Union
 claimed that Germany was getting ready to use chemical weapons. This
 accusation was based on the capture of a German manual on the offensive
 use of gas. In response, Germany was quick to announce through its official
 news agency that the manual was merely a training guide, allowed by the
 Geneva Protocol, and not an imminent plan.'04 That same summer, German
 military leaders had received five reports from the field that the Soviets had
 used chemical weapons. One involved a bomber, two were artillery attacks
 and two were armored vehicle assaults. The Germans decided that not
 enough "objective" evidence existed that the attacks had occurred. But since
 twelve German soldiers had mustard gas wounds, it was conceded that
 perhaps a single gas bomb had been dropped. Otherwise, however, the
 incident was ignored.'05
 102. Ochsner states that this finding was "a great relief to us." Ochsner, The History of German
 CW, p. 16.
 103. "Pressepropaganda Gelbkreuzgasverwendung durch die polnischen Truppen," September
 23, 1939, RW 5/v.346, BA-MA.
 104. But, "if the Soviets use the discovery of German instructions about gas as an excuse to
 begin gas warfare, Germany will answer appropriately." "Abschrift. Auszug aus der Times vom
 26 July 1941," RW 5/v. 346, BA-MA.
 105. See Armeeoberkommandd 11 an Oberkommando des Heeres, July 1, 1941, RW 5/v. 346,
 BA-MA, for a list and description of the injured soldiers. For the analysis of the incidents see
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 Another provocative accident occurred during the Allied invasion of Italy
 at Anzio in 1943. A German shell struck an Allied weapons depot containing
 chemical munitions. The explosion released a cloud of gas that drifted to-
 wards the German lines. The Allied commander was quick to notify his
 German counterpart that this release of gas was strictly inadvertent. The
 German officer accepted the explanation despite his disadvantage had the
 Allied officer been lying.'06
 Even at the end of the war, when the Germans faced imminent political
 extinction and the Allies feared desperate escalation, there was no last resort
 to CW in the confusing, threatening, frenzied disintegration of the Third
 Reich. In fact, Germany became particularly cautious about unauthorized
 use. Supplies were ordered moved, not destroyed, so as to avoid any event
 that might give the enemy a pretext for CW use.'07 Chemical stocks and
 factories were given top priority in the allocation of scarce transport space.
 Despite precautions, on April 18, 1945, an accident at a chemical depot in
 central Germany led to the contamination of the surrounding twenty kilo-
 meters. The Wehrmacht anticipated that the enemy might point to such an
 incident as an excuse for initiating deliberate use of CW and it recommended
 halting the risky transfer of chemical stocks and giving the Allies the location
 of the sites. Hitler vetoed this order.'08 Nonetheless, there was no escalation.
 ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND INADVERTENCE
 Variations in inadvertent escalation in World War II are explained better by
 organizational culture than other prominent images of escalation. The sig-
 nificant influence of culture is summarized in Table 1. There are two key
 facets of the link between organizational culture and inadvertence. The first
 "Mitteilungen uber Gaskriegsvorbereitungen im Ausland Nr. 10," August 12, 1941, RH 11 IV/v.
 17, BA-MA.
 106. This incident is related by Lord Ritchie-Calder, who was Director of Political Warfare in
 the Foreign Office during the Second World War. See Steven Rose, ed., CBW: Chemical and
 Biological Warfare (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968), p. 14.
 107. Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, "Gaskriegsvorbereitungen," February 4, 1945, RW 4/v.
 720, BA-MA.
 108. Rolf-Dieter Mueller, "World Power Status Through the Use of Gas? German Preparations
 for Chemical Warfare," in Wilhelm Diest, ed., The Wehrmacht and German Rearmament (London:
 Macmillan, 1981), pp. 200-201; Stephen L. McFarland, "Preparing for What Never Came: Chem-
 ical and Biological Warfare in World War II," Defense Analysis, Vol. 2, No. 2 (1986), p. 114; F.H.
 Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations, Vol.
 III, Part II (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 577 and 929-930. Brown, Chemical
 Warfare, p. 237, suggests that Hitler may have ordered gas attacks at the end of the war but
 officers and officials did not carry out his command.
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 Table 1. A Summary of the Cases. Does Theory Predict Inadvertence?
 Traditional
 Security Organization Organizational Actual
 Friction Dilemma Theory Culture Outcome
 SUBMARINE WARFARE
 U.K. Oxely accident ? ? Yes Yes Yes
 U.K. Bremen non-accident No No Yes No No
 Germany No No Yes Yes Yes
 STRATEGIC BOMBING
 U.K. Yes No Yes Yes Yes
 Germany Yes No Yes No No
 CHEMICAL WARFARE
 U.K. Yes Yes Yes No No
 Germany Yes Yes Yes No No
 connects organizational predilections to the types of accidents that are likely.
 Clausewitz tells us that accidents are unpredictable and unavoidable in the
 complexity of war. The incidents reviewed above do seem to have multiple
 causes and do not fit neatly under any one theory except the vastly gener-
 alized and residual one of friction. Nonetheless, some accidents may fit more
 of a pattern than would be suggested by a random-walk thesis. Some degree
 of regularity matches organizations to accidents, as Graham Allison sug-
 gested in Essence of Decision.'09 But the thrust of Allison's argument-and that
 of others who have employed traditional organization-theory logic-assumes
 that, in gross terms, similar organizations act in similar ways. According to
 this logic we should expect militaries with the same structures and functions
 to incur the same types of incidents. But this emphasis on structure neglects
 the importance of beliefs and norms. As was demonstrated by the differences
 between the accidents of German and British submarines, similar structures
 and functions did not produce the same type of results. The submarine forces
 of both navies were prepared to target and destroy enemy ships. But the
 British Navy saw only a role for hitting warships, whereas the German
 109. E.g., Allison, Essence of Decision, pp. 139-140. Where friction was comparable-for example
 in the British and German submarine situations-an accident occurred in one, but not in the
 other. And even where friction is expected to be most decisive-where warfare is complex,
 fighting intense, and information uncertain-accidents did not cause escalation. This was ap-
 parent in the restraint that enduted in CW during the fierce battles on the continent in the latter
 stages of WWII.
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 Navy considered anti-trade attacks as a central form of warfare. A focus on
 this divergence in the hierarchy of beliefs in military organizations more
 accurately accounts for what occurred. The role of culture is more impor-
 tant-and the influence of the armed forces more varied in that they can also
 inhibit accidents, than is recognized by friction, the security dilemma, or a
 traditional organization viewpoint.
 The second, and more important, tie between organizational culture and
 accidents concerns the impact of the unintended incidents that do occur.
 Avoiding accidents altogether may be an impossible task. But as we have
 seen, some accidents lead to escalation, while others do not. Contrary to the
 expectations of the traditional organizational school, militaries do not always
 push events towards escalation, even after hostilities have begun. Depending
 on culture, military organizations may act as inhibitors or as advocates of
 escalation. The armed forces play a central role in war through the devel-
 opment of capabilities, planning, information processing, operational re-
 sponse, and judging military utility, and their cultures thereby have a decisive
 impact on national choices. Where specific means of warfare are compatible
 with one side's organizational culture, accidental use of a taboo means of
 warfare by the enemy often leads to escalation. Militaries and states in such
 situations are likely to emphasize the antagonistic role the other side played,
 encourage propagandistic use of the incident, and stress the military advan-
 tage in their own escalation. Such tendencies increase the likelihood of in-
 advertent escalation, as was evident in German submarine warfare and Brit-
 ain's bombing of Berlin.
 In contrast, when a type of warfare is antithetical to organizational culture,
 restraint endures in the face of provocative enemy incidents. Information
 encouraging escalation is suppressed, enemy actions are taken on faith to be
 accidents, efforts are made to communicate good will to the opposing side,
 and internal proposals to seize propaganda advantages are rejected. These
 dynamics were evident in German strategic bombing, and British and Ger-
 man decisions related to chemical warfare. As we have seen, escalation
 windows are inevitably thrown open in the midst of conflict by the unin-
 tended and often unpredictable incidents that occur in "unthinkable" re-
 stricted means of warfare. But whether states jump through those windows
 seems to be importantly affected by military culture.
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 Contemporary Inadvertence
 Some of the taboos of the inter-war period remain intact to varying degrees
 today. Chemical and biological warfare continue to be stigmatized, and so
 too is strategic bombing, as seen in the allied efforts to avoid civilian casualties
 in the Gulf War. The most striking distinction between the period examined
 above and the modern age is the immensely destructive force of nuclear
 weapons."0I Some believe that any serious armed clash between major power
 antagonists would be likely to result in nuclear use. Some assume that an
 accidental event involving a nuclear weapon, particularly in the midst of
 war, would lead to a widespread exchange.111 What the organizational culture
 approach suggests, however, is that this need not be the case. Depending
 on organizational predilection, some incidents are likely to lead to escalation
 while others will not. Thus for national leaders, the ability to control esca-
 lation involves understanding and managing bureaucratic culture. This is a
 different sort of enterprise than those suggested in other recent studies. It is
 not about the technical specifications and procedures of command and con-
 trol systems.112 Nor is it about the formal structural traits of organizations
 themselves.113 Furthermore, the primary focus is not on the explicit nature of
 civil-military relations and the problem of getting soldiers to adhere to the
 orders and aims of the higher military or civilian leadership, although that
 is certainly a concern.114
 Rather, the policy task is first, to understand the norms and beliefs of
 military services on war-fighting that permeate the plans, capabilities, and
 110. It is unlikely that these powerful tools of violence have neutralized the dynamics of the
 images of inadvertence discussed here. Friction, the security dilemma, and organizational dy-
 namics have all figured prominently in research on the nuclear age; e.g., Barry Posen uses all
 three in his study Inadvertent Escalation.
 111. This is the predominant thrust of traditional organization theory, "friction," and "normal
 accident" theorists, along with most who study nuclear accidents. See Bracken, "Accidental
 Nuclear War," in Graham T. Allison, Albert Carnesale, and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., eds., Hawks,
 Doves, and Owls: An Agenda for Avoiding Nuclear War (New York: W.W. Norton, 1985), pp. 37-
 49; and Sagan, The Limits of Safety, pp. 250-51, 259-264. For an argument that rejects this
 thinking, see John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (New York: Basic
 Books, 1989), pp. 237-238.
 112. E.g., Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War.
 113. Although they acknowledge the role of culture, this is the focus of the "high reliability"
 theorists discussed in Sagan, The Limits of Safety, pp. 14-28.
 114. On control of U.S. nuclear weapons, this issue is covered thoroughly by Peter Douglas
 Feaver, Guarding the Guardians: Civilian Control of Nuclear Weapons in the United States (Ithaca:
 Cornell University Press, 1992).
 International Security 18:4 1 142
 skills available to keep the peace. Secondly, it is to shape that culture, if
 necessary, so that it is compatible with national objectives. These tasks are
 far from simple. Professional military cultures form in a society set apart
 from the broader nation they serve, and such organizations have no domestic
 competitors to ensure that the consumer (i.e., national interest) is well-
 served. Even in the United States, where there is a tradition of civilian
 oversight and "independent" bodies to contribute to military thinking, out-
 siders (especially those who spend four years in Washington and then move
 on) sometimes have problems gaining obedience to explicit directives, let
 alone the ability to affect organizational culture.115 Nonetheless, there is a
 need for alternative parties-probably civilian experts authorized by the high-
 est levels of government-to review operational plans.116 This is not about
 who has the final say in using force: that is clearly the political leadership.
 Instead, the issue is how choice is subtly, but powerfully, circumscribed by
 the pre-existing organizational mind-set, with its attendant capabilities, skills,
 and intelligence, that dominates operational thinking. Thus, the central task
 is to explicate and assess the assumptions and beliefs that shape the way
 that militaries think about practical war-fighting in terms both of their own
 efficacy and of political objectives.
 The aim of such an effort would not be to de-professionalize or to politicize
 America's competent armed forces.117 Nor is it to blame soldiers for doing
 an inadequate job. Militaries cannot be considered the cause of war, nor
 should they be pictured as an unwavering source of escalation. The armed
 forces can act as a friend of restraint as well as a foe (and either role might
 serve a national purpose). Nonetheless, the pervasive influence of military
 culture on inadvertence suggests the need to improve understanding of the
 beliefs and norms that characterize these organizations. It is certainly in the
 national interest, and to the benefit of international security, that war-fighting
 cultures be compatible with higher level political strategy and goals.
 115. A range of anecdotes and analysis on this topic are found in Janne E. Nolan, Guardians of
 the Arsenal: The Politics of Nuclear Strategy (New York: Basic Books, 1989), pp. 5-6, 31-32, 248-
 285; and Feaver, Guarding the Guardians, pp. 227-229, 232-234, 242-244.
 116. Posen, Inadvertent Escalation, p. 217, offers some good proposals along these lines.
 117. The dangers of doing so have been articulated in the classic work by Samuel P. Huntington,
 The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, Mass.:
 Harvard University Press, 1957).
